A Study on Audit Independence and Corporate Governance of Private Commercial Bankers of Bangladesh

Mohiuddin, Golam

doi:10.18052/www.scipress.com/ILSHS.44.1

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A Study on Audit Independence and Corporate Governance of Private Commercial Bankers of Bangladesh

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Abstract:

Auditors lodge an exclusive position in the business community when they implement an audit for clients. Auditors are called upon to verify to financial statements and to safeguard the interest of various parties. In recent years the audit practice because of several humiliations has been diluted. This empirical study shows that several factors effect on audit independence in Bangladesh. The results show that there is a huge difference between auditors and bankers on audit independence. It has come to the conclusion that for solving this problem well-established corporate governance can improve audit independence.

Info:

Periodical:

International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences (Volume 44)

Pages:

1-12

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18052/www.scipress.com/ILSHS.44.1

Citation:

G. Mohiuddin, "A Study on Audit Independence and Corporate Governance of Private Commercial Bankers of Bangladesh", International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences, Vol. 44, pp. 1-12, 2015

Online since:

December 2014

Authors:

Golam Mohiuddin

Keywords:

Audit Independence, Auditor’s Perception, Corporate Governance, Economic Dependence

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Distribution:

Open Access

This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

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